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Abstract—Recently, the expansive growth of wireless services, 
regulated by governmental agencies assigning spectrum to licensed 
users, has led to a shortage of radio spectrum. Since the FCC 
(Federal Communications Commissions) approved unlicensed 
users to access the unused channels of the reserved spectrum, new 
research areas seeped in, to develop Cognitive Radio Networks 
(CRN), in order to improve spectrum efficiency and to exploit this 
feature by enabling secondary users to gain from the spectrum in 
an opportunistic manner via optimally distributed traffic demands 
over the spectrum, so as to reduce the risk for monetary loss, from 
the unused channels. However, Cognitive Radio Networks become 
vulnerable to various classes of threats that decrease the 
bandwidth and spectrum usage efficiency. Hence, this survey deals 
with defining and demonstrating framework of one such attack 
called the Primary User Emulation Attack and suggests 
p r e v e n t i v e  Sensing Protocols to counteract the same. It presents 
a scenario of the attack and its prevention using Network 
Simulator-2 for the attack performances and gives an outlook on 
the various techniques defined to curb the anomaly. 
Keywords----primary user emulation, primary user, sensing 
technique, network simulator, effective spectrum usage, secondary 
users, ma l i c i o u s  users 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless networks have involved a lot of interest in the 
research area due to their potential applicability in innumerable 
real-world practical applications. However, due to the distributed 
nature and their usage in critical applications without human 
interventions, sensitivity and criticality of data communicated, 
these networks are highly vulnerable to security and/or privacy 
threats that can unfavorably affect their performance. These 
issues become further critical in cognitive networks in which the 
nodes have the capabilities of changing their transmission and 
reception parameters according to the radio environment under 
which they operate, in order to achieve reliable and efficient 
communication and optimum utilization of the network 
resources.  
The increasing demand for spectrum in wireless 
communication has made efficient spectrum utilization a big 
challenge. To address this important requirement, Cognitive 
Radio (CR) technology has evolved as the answer. A CR is 
an intelligent wireless communication system that is aware 
of its surrounding environment, and adapts its internal 
parameters to achieve reliable and efficient communication 
and optimum utilization of the resources [1]. The cognitive 
technique is the process of knowing through perception, 
planning, reasoning, acting, and continuously updating and 
upgrading with a history of learning [4]. It has the ability to 
know the unutilized spectrum in a license and unlicensed 
spectrum band, and utilize the unused spectrum 
opportunistically. The incumbents or primary users (PU) 
have the right to use the spectrum anytime, whereas 
secondary users (SU) can utilize the spectrum only when the 
PU is not using it. Each country has its own spectrum 
regulation rules. A certain band available in one country 
might not be available in another. Traditional wireless 
networks with a preset working frequency might not work in 
cases where the manufactured wireless nodes are deployed in 
different regions. On the other hand, if nodes are equipped 
with cognitive radio capability, they can overcome the 
spectrum incompatibility problem by changing their 
communication frequency band. Therefore, CR wireless 
devices have the potential to be operated almost anywhere in 
the world [4]. 
Design of a CR network poses many new technical 
challenges in protocol design, power efficiency, spectrum 
management, spectrum detection, environment awareness, 
novel distributed algorithms design for decision making, 
distributed spectrum measurements, quality of service (QoS) 
guarantees, and security [1]. In CNs, the cognitive engine in 
a sensor node has many radio parameters under its control. 
The cognitive engine determines the suitable values of these 
parameters over time in order to optimize its multi-goal 
objective functions. Various attacks are possible on the 
learning algorithms of the cognitive engines so that these 
algorithms produce suboptimal outputs [1]. Since these 
attacks are targeted on the learning algorithms, they are also 
known as the belief- manipulation attacks. The cognitive 
radio may have three goals such as achieving low-transmit 
power, high rate of transmission, and high security in 
communication. Based on the application currently under 
use, the cognitive engine assigns different weights to these 
three goals to maximize its overall objective function. An 
attacker can compromise a user by breaking the Dynamic 
Spectrum Access (DSA) mechanism by implementing 
spectrum misuse or by exhibiting selfish behavior [1]. For 
example, the attacker node can transmit in an unassigned 
band or it can ignore the cognitive messages sent by the 
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other users in the network. Hence identification of various 
possible attacks on CNs is critical in order to design 
appropriate security schemes to defend against those attacks.  
A well-known malicious attack is the primary user 
emulation attack (PUEA). In PUEA, malicious users mimic 
the primary signal over the idle frequency band(s) such that 
the authorized secondary users cannot use the corresponding 
white space(s) [6]. This leads to low spectrum utilization and 
inefficient cognitive network operation. The PUE attack 
means that an attacker sends out primary-user-alike signals 
during the spectrum sensing period of secondary users, thus 
“scaring away” the secondary users since they are unable to 
distinguish the signals from primary users and the attacker 
[2]. The goal of the adversary is to mislead the SUs 
regarding the available spectrum opportunities, thus 
preventing them from utilizing idle channels [5]. This attack 
is particularly easy to launch in CRNs due to the highly 
flexible and software-based air interfaces of CR nodes. The 
PUE attack can be catastrophic, since it severely interferes 
with spectrum sensing process. 
II. DESIGN 
The steps for development of an attack can be (shown in 
Fig.1): 
1. Consider two wireless networks. 
2. Users check the availability of channel in one of the two 
networks. 
3. Secondary users sense the channel according to the 
channel availability. 
4. SUs check for free/available channel (i.e. unlicensed 
channel). 
5. The band width may be limited to access maximum 
number of users. 
6. The attackers will be formed. 
7. The attacker emits signal similar to the Primary user’s 
signal. 
8. Secondary users will be informed that there are no unused 
channels. 
9. Secondary users won’t get access from any access point. 
 
The conditions that would lead to effective PUE attacks 
are: little or no PU-SU interaction, different signal 
characteristics of PU and SU signals, primary signal learning 
and channel measurement and avoiding interference with 
primary network [7]. Some potential consequences of PUE 
attack are Bandwidth wastage, QoS degradation, connection 
unreliability, Denial of Service and interference with 
primary network [7]. Mitigating such a threat would allow 
high global operability and hence, can become an effective 
solution for rapid deployment of mobile users during rescue 
missions, disaster relief operations and emergencies, like the 
9/11 attack on the twin towers in the US. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Attacker illustration 
 
 
Fig. 2 SUs sensing for channels among 2 networks before attack 
formation  
To mitigate the effectiveness of such an attack, cognitive 
radios should [9]: 
- Always assume sensory input statistics are “noisy” and 
subject to manipulation; 
- Be programmed with some amount of “common sense” to 
attempt to validate learned beliefs; 
- Compare and validate learned beliefs with other devices 
on the network; 
- Expire learned beliefs to prevent long-term effects of 
attackers; and 
- Attempt to perform learning in known-good environments 
 
Fig. 3 Representing the PUEA 
Node 14 in Fig. 3 tries to sense for any available channel 
by requesting the base station of WLAN network (shown in 
green). Since it does not avail any channel for transmission, 
due to the malicious node, it experiences packet loss. 
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III. METHODOLOGIES AND TECHNIQUES 
A. Robust PUE Detection method  
This algorithm, as stated in [8], analyzes the effect of 
forged reports on the location process of a given emitter and 
provides a set of countermeasures in order to make it robust 
to undesired behaviors or false feedback. 
It has considered Least Square (LS) methods over a 
linearized set of TDoA (Time Difference of Arrival) error 
equations (by means, for example, of Taylor-Series 
Estimations) for stationary networks such as CRNs. LS 
estimation methods are iterative schemes that start with a 
rough initial guess (xv; yv; zv) and improve the guess at 
each step (xv + δx; yv + δy; zv + δz) by determining the 
local linear least-sum squared-error correction (δx; δy; δz). 
The target is to iterate the method until the components of 
the correction are below a given threshold, that is to say, that 
the estimation converges. 
B. The algorithm 
1. Obtain a linear estimation of the measurement errors. 
According to this, given a set of n TDoA measurements ґ i 
taken by the pairs made up of the BS and each one of the 
CRs, the measurement errors assuming a prediction (xv; yv; 
zv) can be expressed as in (2), with ƒ i(x; y; z) as in (1) the 
real TDoA measurement for the pair BS and anchor node i 
for position (x; y; z) 
 
2. From the 1st-degree Taylor polynomial of e, the matrix 
representation of the linearized forms of the distance error 
can be expressed as in (3), with A an n-by-3 matrix with 
the Taylor coefficients and δ a 3-by-1 column vector with 
the corrections (δx; δy; δz). 
 
3. Assuming that ệ is full rank, the value of δ that minimizes 
the sum of quadratic errors ệTệ can be computed as in (4). 
 
4. However, in the real world, measurements performed by 
different nodes are subjected to different errors and then 
their measures may contribute to the LS estimation with 
different weights. Moreover, measurement errors are often 
correlated. Consequently, localization methods, instead of 
the previous approach, often minimize ệTWệ, with W an 
n-by-n matrix with the assigned weights to every measure. 
In such case, the most common approach is to define W 
=R
-1
 with R the matrix of covariances between measures. 
Therefore, the optimal δ can be derived as in (5). 
                
5. False reports provided by compromised nodes can 
severely undermine the location method, thus leading to 
false positives or negatives regarding the detection of 
primary users. Consequently, there is a need for 
identifying false measurements in order to discard them 
for the location process. This task could be accomplished 
by comparing measurements from different nodes and 
looking for large deviations.  
However, measurements can considerably vary depending 
on the position of the CR within the CRN. Therefore, the 
most intuitive way would be to group nodes into clusters and 
compare measurements among nodes belonging to the same 
cluster. Usually, outlier measurements may be (badly) 
detected by means of LS fitting, but it is recommended to 
use Least Median Square (LMS) fitting instead. LMS aims to 
minimize the median of the residue squares as in (6) 
increasing its robustness to deviated measurements. 
 
6. However, the process of minimizing the median of the 
residue squares is prohibitive and then the final position 
estimation should be obtained with a mixed solution: 
a. Divide the set of n CRs into c several clusters of equal 




b. Apply the location process described separately in every 
cluster obtaining an estimation of the position of the 
emitter for each cluster (xv1; yv1; zv1)…. (xvj ;yvj ; zvj)….. 
(xvc; yvc; zvc) 
c. Compute the median of residue squares for each cluster j 
as,        
whereri = νpґi- ƒi (xvj ; yvj ; zvj) is the residue for node i of 
cluster j and ƒi (xvi ; yvi; zvi) as in (1) is an “error-free" 
TDoA measure for the position estimation obtained by 
means of LS method for cluster j. 
d. Select as tentative estimation (xv; yv; zv) the one given by 
the cluster with the lowest median of residues squares. 
e. Compute the residue squares for all the n nodes 
considering the tentative estimation (xv; yv; zv) 
f. Perform new position estimation by applying a LS method 
assigning a different weight to each node's measurement 
according to its residue square. 
This is an implementation of Weighted Least Squares 
(WLS) method 
    Finally, as compromised nodes are likely to report false 
data repeatedly, a trust mechanism should be integrated into 
the system so as to keep track of node's behavior over time. 
C. RSSI based PU localization 
The algorithm given in [11], proposes a PU authentication 
system that securely and reliably delivers PU activity 
information to SUs. The direction of arrival (DOA) and the 
received power level are exploited jointly to obtain the 
transmitter’s location and hence detect the malicious 
devices. That is, given the locations of the primary TV 
stations, the secondary user can distinguish the actual 
primary signal from the malicious user’s signal by estimating 
the transmitter’s DOA and the power level [6]. 
Received Signal Strength (RSS) based detection approach 
analyzes the PUE attack in the CR network without using 
any location information. Thus, this detection approach does 
not need dedicated sensor networks [7]. The PUE attackers 
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are assumed to be distributed randomly around the SUs. 
Hence, Received Signal Strength (RSS) seem to be the most 
suitable for detecting PUE attacks. 
Location verification is achieved by using two techniques 
[3]: 
1) Distance Ratio Test (DRT), which uses the received 
signal strength indicator (RSSI) of a signal source and 
2) Distance Difference Test (DDT), which uses relative 
phase difference of the received signal as the signal is 
received at different receivers.  
It is assumed that the location information of some of the 
CR nodes in the network is always known a priori either 
because these nodes are fixed or they use trusted GPS 
information. These CR nodes perform DRT and DDT 
operations within their coverage areas and also serve as the 
Location Verifiers (LVs). The LVs exchange the location 
information of incumbent transmitters through a cognitive 
pilot channel. This authentication approach is intended to 
prevent the PUE attack in CR networks. 
With RSS-based techniques, assuming that the 
transmission power and the path loss model are known, it is 
possible to estimate the distance from the source to the 
reference node. When transmission power is not known, 
differences between RSS measured at pairs of receivers can 
be considered removing in this way the dependency on the 
actual transmit power. A set of at least three RSS 
measurements is then used to estimate the position of the 
emitter by applying trilateration [8]. Although RSS 
measurements are relatively inexpensive and simple to 
implement in hardware, they are susceptible of high errors 
due to the dynamics of indoor/outdoor environments mainly 
due to multipath signals and shadowing. Now, DRT uses a 
Received Signal Strength (RSS) based method, where two 
dedicated cognitive nodes measure the RSS of the signal 
source and calculate the ratio of these two RSSs to check 
whether it coincides with their distances to the true PU (e.g., 
a TV broadcast tower). Using DDT, the arrival time of the 
transmitted signal from the source is measured by the two 
dedicated cognitive nodes [7]. The product of the time 
difference and the light speed is then compared to the 
distance difference from the true PU to the two dedicated 
nodes in order to identify the source. 
 
 
Fig. 4 RSSI 
The model [11] uses localization schemes to estimate and 
authenticate the location of PU. The scheme is based on 
Received signal power. It is calculated as follows: 
                                 (8) 
Where, 
Pr- Received signal power 
Pt- Transmitted signal power 
a- Constant 
do- Reference distance 
d- Calculated distance 
w- Weight 
FC- Fusion Centre 
Certain assumptions taken with this regard are- All nodes 
must be loosely time synchronized, Location of PU should 
be fixed and known to all SUs, Fusion Center should be used 
to make decision about presence of PU, All SUs must be 
connected to FC using a secure link and There is should be 
no LOS (Line of Sight) path between every SU and PU.  
But, this model fails all the localization based solutions 
for PUEA as the attacker can use a multi antenna array or 
MIMO technology with directional antennas to send PU-TX 
like signals to different SUs with various power levels faking 
the presence of PU. That is, a malicious user can be at a 
location where it has the same DOA and comparable power 
level as that of the actual primary transmitter. 
D. Time of Emission Estimation 
The assumptions taken for this algorithm, as stated in 
[11], are that the Secondary Users and Fusion Center must 
be loosely synchronized and must have a secure 
communication. The Fusion Center cannot be compromised 
as it knows locations of all users (secondary as well as 
primary) and has a good computational power and storage. 
The model proposes ways to eliminate the attacker based on 
certain calculations that are needed for the algorithm. But, 
attacker capabilities must also be kept in minds, as these can 
use antenna arrays, but transmitting with a beam formation at 
different locations at different times is restricted. Multiple 
Attackers can coordinate as the Attackers know location of 
all nodes which can ultimately lead to SU being 
compromised. 
Now, the proposed approach must have Sensors that 
measure Time of Arrival (TOA), a Fusion Center which 
estimates Time of Emission (TOE) and must have 
Robustness against Multiple coordinated attackers, multiple 
compromised secondary users and Node with an Antenna 
Array. This algorithm has got its reach to every SU which 
receives PU like signals from the malicious nodes.  
 
Fig. 5 Design 
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  The algorithm 
1. The Time Of Emission (TOE) must be measured for 
each node present in the network. 
            –                  (9) 
 
 
Fig. 6 Computation method 
2. Get the mean value of all the computed Time Of 
Emissions from the nodes in the CRN. 
                            (10) 
3. After computing the mean of average of all the TOEs, 
find the deviation value for each node present in the 
network. 
                      (11) 
4. Then, compute the following parameters: 
I. Determine μ 
This is the maximum deviation in the measurement 
by a node under a non-attack scenario in the network. 
II. Determine k 
a) If the value is too small? Increase in false 
negative! 
b) If the value is too large? Increase in false alarm! 
c) Tradeoff is needed! 
5. Then, the following conditions must be considered to 
find the scenario result 
If,   δi >μ 
Then,   Increment C 
Where, 
μ -> Maximum allowable deviation 
C -> number of deviated values 
6. Also, 
If,   C > k 
Then, PUEA- Primary User Emulation Attack has been 
formed or detected 
Where, 
k ---> Maximum no. of allowable deviated reports 
Note: A threshold is used to tolerate certain number of 
configured node compromises. But, if almost all nodes 
in network are compromised, then the network is not 
useful. 
In short, 
1. Access point checks the user location.  
2. Distance ratio is calculated where the user is 
located. 
3. Frequently, the beacon messages are sent to check 
the user access probability. 
4. Checks for the user probability ratio in order to 
detect the actual user available. 
5. Localization based transmitter verification takes 
place in access points. 
6. Channel identification and differentiation of the 
user’s location would be done. 
7. This reduces the faked primary user count. 
 
E. PUE Database Assisted Detector based on Action 
Recognition 
    This model, prescribed in [10], introduces a relational 
database system in order to overcome the problem of 
intensive computation. This approach records the feature 
vectors of primary users in the database system, then it 
monitors each user’s FFT (Fast Fourier Transform) sequence 
and compares the unknown users’ feature vectors with those 
in the database. PUs they have a limited number of feature 
vectors, which means the resulting database is stable and 
limited in size. In case that an unknown user’s feature vector 
has a match entity in the database, this approach will 
continue to double check its action in the frequency domain 
using artificial neural network. Otherwise, this unknown user 
will be classified as a PUE. 
    The algorithm makes the following assumptions:(i) All 
the users, including the malicious users and primary users, 
are located within the same frequency band; (ii) Each user’s 
transmission power is much higher than the ambient noise in 
the channel; (iii) The actions and the corresponding feature 
vectors of primary users are known, and they are different 
from the other users. 
    Two different experiments can be conducted in order to 
validate the performance of the database assisted classifier. 
The first experiment uses a computer simulation based on 
Simulink, while the second experiment is based on a 
hardware implementation using the Universal Software 
Radio Peripheral (USRP) Software-Defined Radio (SDR) 
platform.  
In the Simulink experiment, the classification time is 
highly related to the number of primary users. When there 
are more primary users in the system, it costs more time to 
get the conclusion. However, it is noted that with a larger 
number of primary users, it is approximately a linear growth, 
because the classification time is dominated by the database 
searching time. Higher SNR (Signal-Noise Ratio) values 
yield better algorithm performance in terms of successfully 
classifying primary signals and PUE signals. It is very 
reliable and robust.  
    Now, in the SDR platform, the percentage of correct 
classification can be as high as 87.8%, which means that the 
majority of the classification results are correct, so the 
proposed algorithm possesses the potential to be a viable 
PUE detector operating under real world conditions. Hence, 
it is a good candidate for the real world implementation.  
F. Intense Explore System Model 
For novel Intense explore model [12], an infrastructure 
based network of CRs is considered, where multiple nodes 
(or Secondary Users, SUs) may be associated with a 
centralized fusion centre. For the sake of simplicity, 
existence of only one fusion centre is assumed. The fusion 
centre will collect the diagnose results from the cooperative 
secondary user in a regular interval. The main objective of 
diagnosing neighboring secondary users signal is to 
anticipate that any of these secondary users may become a 
malicious user in future and threaten the cognitive radio 
network with PUE attack. 
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           Fig. 7 Relational database with artificial neural network 
In the Intense Explore algorithm, two sets of secondary 
users (SUs) such as At and Bt, are considered. The fusion 
center takes the decision about the suspected malicious user 
based on the reports from the At. Each users in At is 
assumed to be sensing their neighboring users in Bt. Assume 
that if any two SUs in At report the same sensing result 
about the same SU in Bt say Bj, whereby the energy level of 
it exceeds the threshold, then it is suspected to be the 
malicious SU. Thus the fusion center alerts all other SU 
about the suspected user as the malicious SU. The energy 
detection of Bj is done by a separate function specified as 
Energy detection. The energy detection function exploits 
spectral correlation property of cyclostationary feature for 
detecting the energy. This function reports At about the 
suspicious secondary user Bj, if any. This algorithm 
proactively identifies the suspected malicious Secondary 
user. The algorithm is robust and throughput loss along with 
detection latency can be minimized to for about 65%. The 
Intense Explore algorithm and Energy detection function is 
as follows: 
Algorithm: Intense Explore 
1) Input: Set of SUs 
2) Output: Decision report from fusion center 
3) for each slot t do 
4) f ← Fusion Center 
5) At ← Set of cooperative SUs 
6) Bt ← Neighboring SUs of At 
7) for each Ai in At do 
8) Assume Bt as neighboring SUs of Ai 
9) for each Bj in Bt do 
10) //Call function for Energy detection of Bj 
11) R(Ai,Bj)←Energy Detection (Bj) 
12) end for 
13) // Fusion Center Decision 
14) for the same Bj 
15) if (R(Ai, Bj) ← True) for all Ai then 
16) Bj ← Suspected SU 
17) f alerts all the SUs about Bj 
 
Function: Energy Detection 
1) Input: Bj 
2) Output: SCF(Bj), the suspected malicious Su 
3)  Pi ← Threshold 
4)  Si ← Sensed Signal of Bj 
5)  for Si in Bj do 
6)  I ← Identify the autocorrelation function 
7) C ← Fourier transform of autocorrelation function 
8)  SCF(Bj) ← Sensing result of Bj obtained from SCF 
generator 
9)  if (SCF(Bj) > Pi) then 
10)  SCF(Bj) ← True // Here Bj is suspected to be 
malicious user 
11)  return SCF(Bj)  
G. Light weight IDS using CuSum 
The conventional IDSs (Intrusion Detection System) 
usually follow either misuse or anomaly based attack 
detection methods. The misuse based detection method uses 
signatures of already known attacks. However, the misuse 
based approach cannot discover new types of attacks 
effectively[13]. On the other hand, as its name implies, the 
anomaly based detection methodology relies on finding the 
“anomaly”, which represents an abnormal mode of operation 
in the system. However, many of the existing statistical 
detection techniques may not be adequate for designing an 
IDS for CRN as it presents a unique challenge. Specifically 
in CRN, a centralized IDS may not be able to detect a 
malicious attack and notify the secondary users quick 
enough, and therefore, it is important to facilitate lightweight 
yet effective IDSs in the secondary users themselves. It uses 
time-series Cumulative Sum (CuSum) hypothesis testing 
[13]. The reason behind choosing CuSum is due to its low 
complexity and overhead. Each secondary user is assumed to 
have an IDS. The IDS operates in two steps, namely learning 
or profiling phase and detection phase. 
1. Learning phase- 
To effectively detect anomalies due to various types of 
attacks, the IDS needs to be designed in such a manner that it 
may learn the normal behavior of protocol operation, traffic 
flow, primary user access time, packet delivery ratio (PDR), 
signal strength (SS), and so forth. The IDS may learn these 
information by constructing a statistical profile during 
normal CRN conditions or with acceptable (i.e., low) level of 
suspicious activities. The acquired information can facilitate 
the detection phase of the IDS to discover unknown 
intrusions or attacks against the targeted CRN. 
2. Detection phase- 
The proposed IDS detection phase relies on finding the 
point of change in the CRN operation as quickly as possible 
under an attack. Assume that the IDS operates over equal 
time-rounds, ∆n (where n = 1, 2, 3,...). Let the mean of Fn 
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during the profiling period be represented by m. The idea is 
that the IDS continues to monitor a significant change in the 
value of m that can be considered as the influence of the 
attack. m remains close to one until an anomaly occurs. 
However, an assumption of the nonparametric CuSum 
algorithm suggests that the mean value of the random 
sequence should be negative during the normal conditions 
and becomes positive upon a change. Therefore, a new 
sequence Gn=β-Fn is obtained where β is the average of the 
minimum/negative peak values of Fn during the profiling 
period. During an attack, the increase in the mean of Gn can 
be lower bounded by h=(2β). Then, the CuSum sequence 
Yn is expressed as follows: 
        (12) 
Where x
+
=x, if x>0; otherwise x
+
=0. 
A large value of Yn strongly implies an anomaly. The 
detection threshold θ is computed as follows: 
                               (13) 
where tdes  denotes the desired detection time, which 
should be set to a small value for quickly detecting an 
anomaly. 
At the detection phase, the IDS computes Yn over time. 
Yn remains close to zero as long as normal conditions 
prevail in the CRN. Upon an attack, Yn starts to increase. 
When Yn exceeds θ and as long as the SS measured at the 
secondary user is high, the IDS generates an alert of a 
possible attack. IDS will be able to detect the attack with low 
detection latency. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, an overview of Primary User Emulation 
attack has been given, with its design strategy. In order to 
overcome this attack, found in Cognitive Radio Networks, a 
survey of some of the best techniques has been briefly 
specified. A gist of the methods is given in Table 1. Further 
work will be to develop prototypes of such methodologies. 
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Analyzes forged reports to 
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